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Did the framers and ratifiers of the U. S. Constitution think that change in 
American society would require change in the Constitution? If they understood 
the possibility that their society might evolve, how did they expect constitutional 
law, whether the text or its interpretation, to accommodate such develop-
ment? These days, Americans tend to think about the Constitution's response 
to change in terms of a "living constitution." In contrast, during the 1780s, 
many Americans, including many framers and ratifiers, made clear that they 
hoped for a permanent constitution. 
The framers and ratifiers often discussed the implications of social develop-
ments for constitutional law. For example, when Anti-Federalists complained 
about the Constitution's failure to guarantee a jury trial in civil cases, Federalists 
responded that a change of circumstances might, in some instances, render 
the current form of such trial inappropriate and obsolete. As Hamilton 
explained, "the changes which are continually happening in the affairs of 
society may render a different mode of determining questions of property 
preferable in many cases in which that mode of trial now prevails." He sus-
pected "it was impossible in the nature of the thing to fix the salutary point 
at which the operation of the institution ought to stop, and this is with me a 
strong argument for leaving the matter to the discretion of the legislature. '" A 
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similar exchange took place in the Virginia ratification convention on the 
subject of the common law. When Patrick Henry complained that the Con-
stitution "ought to have declared the common law in force," Edmund Ran-
dolph responded that "the common law ought not to be immutably fixed" 
in the Constitution; on the contrary, "[i]t is established only by an act of the 
legislature, and can therefore be changed as circumstances may require it."2 
James Iredell in North Carolina bluntly summarized the underlying point: 
"[T]here is a material difference between an article fixed in the Constitution, 
and a regulation by law," which "can easily be occasionally altered so as 
best to suit the conveniences of the people. "3 
Although the framers and ratifiers tended to assume that constitutions 
should, by their nature, be pennanent, Federalists and Anti-Federalists differed 
on what they meant by this. Anti-Federalists often feared that social develo{T 
ments would undermine liberty and republican government, and they therefore 
objected that numerous rights and other legal barriers needed to be inflexibly 
established by the Constitution. Cato, for example, wanted limits on govern-
ment "explicitly fixed" and explained: "It is alleged that the opinions and 
manners of the people of America are capable to resist and prevent an extension 
of prerogative or oppression, but you must recollect that opinion and manners 
are mutable, and may not always be a permanent obstruction against the 
encroachments of government.'" Like many other Anti-Federalists, he did not 
want the Constitution to accommodate social change, but rather thought it 
should establish liberty permanently regardless of such change. 
Framers and Federalists also tended to assume that constitutions should 
contain what was pennanent, but they perceived permanence in fewer provisions 
than did Anti-Federalists, for they thought any law that would have to 
change according to circumstances could not be permanent. The only surviving 
document on drafting from the 1787 Philadelphia Convention stated that, 
"[i]n the draught of a fundamental constitution, two things deserve attention," 
the first being: "To insert essential principles only, lest the operations of government 
should be clogged by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, 
which ought to be accommodated to times and events. "S The Constitution, in 
other words, had to be adapted to the future already at the time of drafting 
by omitting what would become obsolete. Along similar lines, a well-placed 
observer during the s'ummer of 1787 noted that " [t]he prevailing impression 
as well in, as out of, Convention, is, that a federal Government adapted to 
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the permanent circumstances of the Country, without respect to the habits of 
the day, should be formed."6 Framers and eventually Federalists tended to 
assume in this manner that the Constitution had to exclude all provisions 
that had the potential to become outmoded, and such men therefore tended 
to argue against many provisions that Anti-Federalists considered essential. For 
example, as already seen, Federalists rejected the idea that the Constitution 
should have included a guarantee of jury trial in civil cases, for "the changes 
which are continually happening in the affairs of society may render a differ-
ent mode of determining questions of property preferable.'" In short, much 
of what Anti-Federalists thought should be permanently established by the 
Constitution notwithstanding social change, Federalists decried as incapable 
of permanence and appropriate only for legislative discretion. 
Even with their differences, most commentators-whether framers or 
ratmers, Federalists or Anti-Federalists-held some beliefs in cornmon. Although 
they often disagreed about what could be permanent, they tended to share an 
assumption that constitutional law should be permanent-that is, both inflex-
ible and enduring. Of course, not all framers and ratifiers conformed exactly 
to the opinions outlined here. For example, a relatively small number of 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists held such views but also welcomed the pos-
sibility that the Constitution would have to be adapted, by amendments, to 
alterations in society. Typically, however, Federalists and Anti-Federalists seem 
to have assumed that, as much as possible, the Constitution should be drafted 
so that it would not evolve. 
In retrospect, one may doubt whether any group of individuals could 
have the foresight and wisdom to craft a constitution that could be permanent 
in either the way desired by Anti-Federalists or the way sought by most 
framers and Federalists. As Madison acknowledged, "What change of cir-
cumstances[,] time[,] and a fuller population of our country may produce, 
requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which make no part of my preten-
sions."· Yet even while making this profession of modesty, Madison and 
many of his colleagues among the framers and Federalists repeatedly attempted 
to anticipate at least the range of possible future developments, including 
"revolutions" in demographics, the economy, and social conditions." They 
understood that they could not predict the future, but they did not therefore 
consider their task unmanageable, for rather than seek detailed constitutional 
regulation of what could not yet be known, they usually hoped merely to 
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omit constitutional provisions that would have to change. 
Americans today often assume that they are too distant from their eigh-
teenth-century predecessors to understand them. Many Americans then , 
however, did not hesitate to "look forward to remote futurity." Although 
their task in looking forward was more difficult than ours in looking back, 
they did not flinch, for they understood that "[c]onstitutions of civil Govern-
ment are not to be framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but 
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